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Arbitrator impartiality and procedural fairness are expected in international 
arbitration. However, international arbitration simultaneously serves other goals, including 
the recognition and enforceability of awards that are more difficult to attain in other types 
of dispute resolution. When parties sign an arbitration agreement, they undergo a binding 
dispute resolution process that leads to a binding award. However, Croatia v. Slovenia, a 
unique case, highlighted the conflict between the binding nature of the award and the 
integrity of arbitral proceedings.1 When a party engages in ex parte communications with 
a party-appointed arbitrator, is the arbitral process necessarily threatened?  The article will 
discuss the background of the controversy between Croatia and Slovenia regarding the Bay 
of Piran/Savudrija, the Partial Award issued by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the 
Tribunal’s rationale, and the expectation of the parties to settle their disputes in good faith 
and in accordance with arbitrator impartiality, independence, and procedural fairness.  
II.  BACKGROUND OF THE CONTROVERSY: THE BAY OF PIRAN/SAVUDRIJA 
The current dispute between Croatia and Slovenia concerns the maritime border 
controversy along the Bay of Savudrija, as named in Croatia, or the Bay of Piran, as named 
in Slovenia (“the Bay”).2  Well known for its Sečovlje saltpans and fishing locations, the 
Bay and the land between the Bay and Istria underwent border changes during and after 
the Second World War.3  Following the enactment of the Treaty of Osimo in 1975 and 
Slovenia’s and Croatia’s independence from Yugoslavia on June 25, 1991, border 
controversies between the two nations arose.4 These controversies centered on both the 
                                                 
* Matko Ilić is an Associate Editor of the Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation and a 2018 Juris Doctor 
Candidate at The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law. 
1 Croatia v. Slovenia, PCA Case Repository 2012-04, Partial Award, P 16 (Perm. Ct. Arb. June 30, 2016). 
2 Drago Kladnik & Primož Pipan, Bay of Piran or Bay of Savudrija? An Example of Problematic Treatment 
of Geographical Names, 48 ACTA GEOGRAPHICA SLOVENICA 57, 59 (2008). 
3 See generally Primož Pipan, Border Dispute Between Croatia and Slovenia Along the Lower Reaches of 
the Dragonja River, 48 ACTA GEOGRAPHICA SLOVENICA 331, 336-39 (2008) (describing in detail the border 
shift between Slovenia and Croatia before and after the formation of the Free Territory of Trieste in 1947); 
Giuseppe Cataldi, Prospects for the Judicial Settlement of the Dispute Between Croatia and Slovenia Over 
Piran Bay, in INT’L CTS. AND THE DEV. OF INT’L LAW 257, 257 (explaining the effect of the 1975 Treaty of 
Osimo between Italy and Yugoslavia, which applied the principle of equidistance to alter the 1947 borders 
surrounding the Bay). 
4 Pipan, supra note 3, at 333. 
location of several villages near the Dragonja River and the demarcation line of the Bay.5  
In 2001, the Croatian and Slovenian governments tried to resolve the border dispute along 
the Bay and the villages near the Dragonja River by planning out the Drnovšek-Račan 
treaty.6 Under this agreement, both parties would set new territorial and high sea 
coordinates along their sea surface as well as create joint bodies that would demarcate the 
lines of the state borders.7 However, in 2002, Croatia failed to sign the pact, which would 
have positioned the new border at the bed of the Dragonja River.8 The following nine years 
were characterized as times of constant disagreement regarding the proposed borders of 
the Bay.9  
 On May 1, 2004, Slovenia joined the European Union, which shaped future Bay 
discussions with its neighbor, Croatia.10  Namely, Slovenia vetoed Croatia’s EU-accession 
negotiations due to the maritime dispute.11 To move forward with  the European Union 
accession talks, Croatia agreed to arbitrate the border dispute with Slovenia.12 The 
resolution of the maritime issues was a prerequisite for Croatia’s admission to the European 
Union under Article 9 of the Arbitration Agreement.13 An agreement to arbitrate the 
                                                 
5 Pipan, supra note 3, at 333 (stating the impact of the border dispute on three villages near the Bay: Mlini-
Škrile, Bužini, and Škodelin). 
6 Treaty Between the Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of Croatia on the Common State Border, Croat.-
Slovn., July 20, 2001. 
7 Id. 
8 Pipan, supra note 3, at 343 (describing the Drnovšek-Račan agreement, which was named after the Prime 
Ministers of Slovenia and Croatia, respectively, where the three villages mentioned in note 3 “were to become 
Croatian,” should have Croatia accepted the agreement); see also Matej Avbelj & Jernej Letnar Černič, The 
Conundrum of the Piran Bay: Slovenia v. Croatia – The Case of Maritime Delimitation, 5 U.  PA. J. INT’L L. 
& POL’Y 1, 11 (presenting the planned maritime border, as proposed by the delimitation agreement; Croatia 
has not ratified the proposal). 
9 Cataldi, supra note 3, at 258 (summarizing the Slovenian argument, in which: (a) Slovenia was a 
“geographically disadvantaged State” as a result of its landlocked status and thus demanded an “Exclusive 
Economic Zone”; and (b) the Bay was a “historical bay,” which would grant Slovenia a right of direct junction 
to the waters); see generally Damir Arnaut, Stormy Waters on the Way to the High Seas: The Case of the 
Territorial Sea Delimitation Between Croatia and Slovenia, 8 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 21, 48-50 (2002). 
10 Countries: Slovenia, EUROPEAN STABILITY INITIATIVE (Sept. 16, 2009), 
http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=395. 
11 Slovenia Will Veto Croatia’s EU Entry, MINA (Dec. 17, 2008), 
http://macedoniaonline.eu/content/view/4801/46. 
12 Cataldi, supra note 3, at 259 (“[I]t is encouraging to note that membership of the Union . . . is a fundamental 
element in bringing together two nations and encouraging a positive solution to an ongoing dispute.”). 
13 Arbitration Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the Government of the 
Republic of Slovenia, THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, art. 9 (Nov. 4, 2009), 
http://www.mvep.hr/files/file/dokumenti/arbitraza/en/150902-arbitration-agreement-between-the-
border-lines of the Bay would fulfill the requirement, as suggested in draft agreements by 
the European Commissioner for Enlargement.14 The negotiations for Croatia’s accession 
were on standby until a Slovenian referendum on June 5, 2010 ended its reservations on 
several negotiating matters.15 Slovenia permitted Croatia’s entry to the EU, provided that 
Croatia resolved the maritime dispute with Slovenia via state-to-state arbitration.16  
Ultimately, both parties agreed to initiate arbitration, and they signed the Arbitration 
Agreement in Stockholm on November 4, 2009.17 Under the Arbitration Agreement, both 
parties promised to settle their disputes “peace[fully]” and “in the spirit of good 
neighbourly relations” in accordance with Article 33 of the United Nations Charter.18  
A. The Preparation and Purpose of the Arbitration Agreement 
 The arbitral proceedings began on April 13, 2012, and the parties agreed to apply 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes Between Two 
States.19 The seat of the arbitration was Brussels, Belgium.20 In accordance with the 
agreement, on January 17, 2012, the counsel for Slovenia and Croatia selected Judge 
Gilbert Guillaume of France, Prof. Vaughan Lowe QC of England, and Judge Bruno 
Simma of Germany as arbitrators.21 Two weeks after the selection of the arbitrators, 
                                                 
government-of-croatia-and-the-government-of-slovenia-04112009.pdf [hereinafter Arbitration Agreement]; 
see also Cataldi, supra note 3, at 259. 
14 Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 3.  
15 Phil Cain, Croatia Poised for EU Membership Following Slovenian Border Dispute Referendum, THE 




17 Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 1-2. 
18 Arbitration Agreement, supra note 13, at art. 4; see also U.N. Charter art. 33, ¶ 1 (“The parties to any 
dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, 
shall, first of all, seek a solution by . . . arbitration . . . or other peaceful means of their own choice.”); Cataldi, 
supra note 3, at 259. 
19 Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 4; Permanent Court of Arbitration Optional Rules for Arbitrating 
Disputes Between Two States, available at https://pca-cpa.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/175/2016/01/Optional-Rules-for-Arbitrating-Disputes-between-Two-States_1992.pdf 
[hereinafter PCA Optional Rules]. 
20 Arbitration Agreement, supra note 13, at art. 6(7). 
21 Case View: Arbitration Between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Slovenia, PERMANENT COURT 
OF ARBITRATION, https://pcacases.com/web/view/3. 
Slovenia selected Dr. Jernej Sekolec while Croatia chose Prof. Budislav Vukas as party-
appointed arbitrators.22  
 After the selection of the arbitrators, both parties saw the arbitral proceedings as 
important in settling the long-fought border battle.23 Dr. Vesna Pusić, the Croatian Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, praised the task before the Arbitral Tribunal and described the 
upcoming award as “a beacon for international law.”24 On the Slovenian side, Mr. Karl 
Erjavec, the Slovenian Minister of Foreign Affairs, stressed the need for access to the High 
Sea, which the Minister characterized as a “vital interest” for Slovenia.25 Both parties listed 
the main disputes in issue under Article 3(1) of the Arbitration Agreement, including “the 
course of the maritime and land boundary,” “Slovenia’s junction to the High Sea,” and “the 
regime for the use of relevant maritime areas.”26   
Citing Article 4(a) of the Arbitration Agreement’s “Applicable Law,” the counsel 
for Croatia requested the Tribunal to first apply “the rules and principles of international 
law,” including Article 15 of the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS), 
so that the territorial borders would lie in accordance with the boundary at the time of both 
nations’ independence from Yugoslavia in 1991.27 However, the Slovenian counsel, 
interested primarily in the junction to the High Sea, pointed instead to Article 4(b), in which 
the finalization of the border would be dependent on “international law, equity and the 
principle of good neighbourly relations in order to achieve a fair and just result.”28 
B. The Ex Parte Communications 
 
 Despite the steadfast assurances of Slovenia and Croatia in agreeing to settle their 
disputes through the good faith application of international law, evidence emerged that 
Slovenia violated the Arbitration Agreement by engaging in ex parte communications with 
                                                 
22 Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 4 (complying with art. 2, ¶ 2 of the Arbitration Agreement). 
23 See Press Release, Permanent Court of Arbitration, Conclusion of Hearing in the Arbitration Between the 
Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Slovenia (June 17, 2014), https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/241 
[hereinafter Press Release June 2014]. 
24 See id. (“[Dr. Pusić] emphasized the importance that Croatia and the Croatian people attach to these 
proceedings.”). 
25 Id. 
26 Arbitration Agreement, supra note 13, at art. 3(1). 
27 Id. at art. 4(a); Press Release June 2014, supra note 23, at 1-2. 
28 Arbitration Agreement, supra note 13, at art. 4(b) (emphasis added); Press Release June 2014, supra note 
23, at 3; see also Cataldi, supra note 3, at 266 (“Common sense can and must guide the Tribunal.  If this is 
done, . . . it will have provided a successful solution to a controversy . . . without neglecting political aspects 
and principles of equity.”) (emphasis added). 
its party-appointed arbitrator on July 22, 2015.29 First, the Serbian newspaper Newsweek 
revealed leaked transcripts of conversations between Slovenia’s party-appointed arbitrator, 
Dr. Sekolec, and Ms. Simona Drenik, the Legal Adviser and Agent for Slovenia, which 
were allegedly recorded on November 15, 2014, and January 11, 2015.30 In addition, the 
Croatian newspaper Večernji published evidence of the same ex parte communications, 
which evidenced that Slovenia violated the arbitral agreement.31 According to the 
transcript, the Slovenian agent and arbitrator discussed the proposed delimitation of the 
Croatian-Slovenian boundary lines.32 The evidence also showed that Ms. Drenik proposed 
a strategy on how to influence the arbitrators so that they rule in favor of Slovenia.33 Next, 
Dr. Sekolec assigned Ms. Drenik the task of preparing effectivités for the arbitration, and 
the Slovenian arbitrator proposed to create a computer file with Ms. Drenik’s cadaster 
documents, which left an impression that Dr. Sekolec was the original author.34 In response 
                                                 
29 Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 6, 16 (citing Article 9.1 of the Terms of Appointment, which stated 
that “[t]he Parties shall not engage in any oral or written communications with any member of the Arbitral 
Tribunal ex parte in connection with the subject matter of the arbitration or any procedural issues that are 
related to the proceedings.”). 
30 Id.; Poslušajte Audio-Zapis Kako Slovenci Preotimaju Hrvatima Piranski Zaliv [Listen to the Audio 
Recording as to How the Slovenes are Seizing the Bay of Piran from the Croats], NEWSWEEK (July 22, 2015, 
3:26 PM), http://www.newsweek.rs/region/53276-njuzvik-ekskluzivno-otkriva-poslusajte-audio-zapis-
kako-slovneci-preotimaju-hrvatima-piranski-zaliv-video.html (Serb.). 
31 Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 6, 16; Alison Ross, “Poisoned Waters”: Croatia’s Stance on the 
Sekolec Scandal, 10 GLOBAL ARB. REV. 15 (Aug. 19, 2015), 
http://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1034698/“poisoned-waters”-croatia’s-stance-on-the-sekolec-
scandal; Sandra Veljković, Donosimo Audiosnimku Razgovora Arbitra i Slovenske Predstavnice [We Bring 
the Audio Recording of the Conversation Between the Arbitrator and the Slovenian Representative], 
VEČERNJI LIST (July 22, 2015, 3:33 PM), http://www.vecernji.hr/nagradjeni_autori/ekskluzivno-donosimo-
razgovor-arbitra-i-slovenske-strane-poslusajte-snimke-1015908 (Croat.). 
32 Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 14-16; Excerpts from Recordings of Conversation Between Dr. Jernej 
Sekolec, Member of the Arbitral Tribunal, and Ms. Simona Drenik, Agent of the Republic of Slovenia, 
REPUBLIC OF CROAT.: MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AND EUR. AFF. 1 (2015), 
http://www.mvep.hr/files/file/dokumenti/arbitraza/hr/150820-excerpts-from-recordings-between-dr-
sekolec-and-mr-drenik-14082015.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2016) [hereinafter Excerpts from Recordings]. 
33 Excerpts from Recordings, supra note 32, at 2 (providing that Dr. Sekolec said, “When [Guillaume and I] 
had coffee break, Guillaume came to me and said, between us, in four eyes, ‘you are pushing very hard, but 
you know, Croatia…’ He said, ‘you got what you needed in the sea.’”), 12 (according to Ms. Drenik, “[Y]ou 
(Sekolec) give [Simma] one or two (murmur), say, OK, you know ‘I looked at this, so you know, I think…’ 
Not that you would give him 500 arguments. But you say ‘I think, look at this...’ . . . Maybe he will then 
present it, but if you present it, he will look at it, Guillaume I mean. But if Simma says ‘Oh, it seems to me, 
we could look at this again.’”). 
34 Id.; Effectivités, ENCYCLOPAEDIC DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (3d ed. 2009) (“[E]ffectivités are 
acts by a State relevant to a claim of title to territory by occupation or prescription; the factual elements that 
demonstrate the exercise of governmental authority in a territory.”). 
to the revealed transcripts, Dr. Sekolec resigned from his position as party-appointed 
arbitrator on July 23, 2015.35  
 After evidence of Slovenia’s ex parte communications was revealed, Croatia 
highlighted the communication during arbitral proceedings.36  Describing the event as an 
“apparent collusion” between the Slovenian parties and Dr. Sekolec, the Croatian counsel 
cited Article 9.1 of the Terms of Appointment, which forbade ex parte communications.37 
Croatia described the incident as a “fundamental breach of professional ethics and 
dishonesty that . . . violat[ed] . . . fundamental due process,” thus depicting the entire 
arbitration process as “tainted.”38 By citing Article 60(1) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (“Vienna Convention”), which allows parties to rescind “treat[ies]” when 
a “material breach of a bilateral treaty” has occurred, the Croatian Parliament unanimously 
and unilaterally revoked the Arbitration Agreement on July 29, 2015.39 Despite recognizing 
that Ms. Drenik was engaged in ex parte communications, Slovenia disagreed with Croatia 
that the violation was a “material breach” of the Arbitration Agreement; namely, a 
“material breach” had to act as “a gross infringement of an essential provision.”40 
C. Reactions to the Ex Parte Communications 
1. Croatia’s Reactions 
 
 Collectively, the Croatian counsel expressed disapproval with the close 
communications between Dr. Sekolec and Ms. Drenik and their effect on the arbitral 
                                                 
35 Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 16; Ross, supra note 31, at 9. 
36 Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 16. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 16-17 (“The communications appear to reveal . . . [the disclosure of] critical elements of the Arbitral 
Tribunal’s deliberations to Slovenia’s Agent. . . .”). 
39 See id. at 18; see also Arbitration Row May Hurt Zagreb More than Ljubljana, OXFORD ANALYTICA DAILY 
BRIEF SERVICE (July 30, 2015), 
http://search.proquest.com.ezaccess.libraries.psu.edu/docview/1700147308?pq-
origsite=summon&accountid=13158; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 60(1), opened for 
signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“A material breach of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties 
entitles the other to invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending its operation in 
whole or in part.”) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
40 Press Release, Permanent Court of Arbitration, Slovenia Demands Continuation of Arbitration Proceedings 
(Aug. 19, 2015), https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1403 [hereinafter Press Release August 2015]; see 
Vienna Convention, supra note 39, at art. 60(1); Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 34. 
proceedings.41 However, as Croatia emphasized, the resignations of the breaching parties 
and the reconstitution of the Tribunal could not “begin to address the gravity of the 
situation,” which displayed Croatia’s hesitance with any further involvement with the 
arbitration.42 Furthermore, Croatia wrote a letter to the arbitrators on July 24, 2015, and 
elaborated on the “irreparable harm” caused by the ex parte discussions: 
The communications appear to reveal that Arbitrator Sekolec inter alia 
disclosed critical elements of the Arbitral Tribunal’s deliberations to 
Slovenia’s Agent; advised her on the issues on which he believed the 
Tribunal was inclined to rule in Slovenia’s favour, and on which issues it 
was not so inclined; requested that Ms. Drenik provide him with arguments 
and “facts” not already in the record so that he could use them in his 
discussions with other members of the Arbitral Tribunal as his own; 
conspired with Ms. Drenik to assure that the other members of the Tribunal 
would not know their true source; communicated these arguments and 
“facts” to the other members of the Tribunal on the basis that they were his 
own.43 
 In Croatia’s view, Dr. Sekolec’s “numerous” discussions with the members of the 
Tribunal and the PCA in a period of thirteen months led to a great likelihood that previously 
unadmitted evidence would either end up in possession of the arbitrators or would affect 
the arbitrators’ decision-making process without Croatia’s knowledge.44  Dr. Pusić 
previously echoed these concerns in the beginning of 2015, in which Mr. Erjavec had 
allegedly received and publicized confidential information regarding the arbitration.45 
Erjavec’s reports to the Slovenian media were released on January 7, 2015, April 22, 2015, 
and June 26, 2015.46 Thus, Croatia feared that Slovenia possessed “an additional channel 
of communications” with the Arbitral Tribunal, and the past conversations with the 
                                                 
41 Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 16 (“[T]he most fundamental principles of procedural fairness, due 
process, impartiality and integrity of the arbitral process have been systematically and gravely violated. . . 
.”). 
42 See id. 
43 Id. 
44 See id. at 17; Ross, supra note 31, at 6, 8 (referring to Croatia’s lack of knowledge regarding the precise 
extent in which the ex parte discussions had shaped the thought process of the arbitrators and the entire 
arbitration, as commented by Zoran Milanović, the then-Prime Minister of Croatia). 
45 Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 5-6; Ross, supra note 31, at 7, 10 (according to the Slovenian 
Parliament on February 2, 2013, Slovenia would have treated the Tribunal’s decision as ultra vires if Slovenia 
did not obtain access to the High Sea). 
46  Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 5-6. 
Slovenian media strengthened Croatia’s stance towards rescinding the Arbitration 
Agreement.47 
 On July 30, 2015, the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed Croatia’s 
decision to end any further participation in the arbitral proceedings, remarking that 
Slovenia had materially breached the Arbitration Agreement, according to Article 60(1) 
and (3) of the Vienna Convention and Articles 6 and 10 of the Arbitration Agreement.48 In 
particular, the Ministry regarded the ex parte violations and sharing of unadmitted evidence 
as “unlawful” and “unethical,” such that the damage inflicted upon the arbitration was 
“irreparable.”49 Quoting the Vienna Convention and the Arbitration Agreement, the 
Ministry explained that the illegal communications among the Slovenian parties rendered 
the “object or purpose” of the Arbitration Agreement impossible to fulfill.50 Since Croatia 
could not continue the proceedings in good faith, the Ministry felt justified to terminate the 
Arbitration Agreement.51 
2. Slovenia’s Reactions 
Although Slovenia conceded that the ex parte communications between Sekolec 
and Drenik violated Article 9(1) of the Terms of Appointment, the counsel did not agree 
with Croatia’s assertion that the Arbitral Tribunal was obliged to terminate the Arbitration 
Agreement.52 First, by citing Victor Pey Casado v. Chile, Slovenia downplayed the 
significance of ex parte violations regarding the continuation of the arbitral proceedings.53 
                                                 
47  Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 6; Ross, supra note 31, at 7. 
48 Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 18; Vienna Convention, supra note 39, at art. 60(1) (“A material 
breach of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles the other to invoke the breach as a ground for 
terminating the treaty or suspending its operation in whole or in part.”), art. 60(3) (“A material breach of a 
treaty, for the purposes of this article, consists in: (a) a repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the present 
Convention; or (b) the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of 
the treaty.”), art. 65(3) (referring both parties to “a solution” in accordance with Article 33 of the United 
Nations Charter); Arbitration Agreement, supra note 13, at art. 6(2) (referring to the violation of the Optional 
Rules of the PCA), art. 10 (“Both Parties refrain from any action or statement which might intensify the 
dispute or jeopardize the work of the Arbitral Tribunal.”). 
49 Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 18. 
50 Id.; Ross, supra note 31, at 8. 
51 Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 23 (“[S]uch an award, if rendered, ‘could never be implemented, or 
enforced.’”). 
52 See id. at 29 (citing Victor Pey Casado and Foundation “Presidente Allende” v. Republic of Chile, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/98/2, Award of 8 May 2008, ¶¶ 34-43); Arbitration Agreement, supra note 13, at art. 3(4) 
(referring to the Arbitral Tribunal’s kompetenz-kompetenz, in which “[t]he Arbitral Tribunal has the power 
to interpret the present Agreement”); PCA Optional Rules, supra note 19, at art. 21 (explaining the 
kompetenz-kompetenz doctrine). 
53 Ross, supra note 31, at 11; see, e.g. V.V. Veeder, The Historical Keystone to International Arbitration: 
The Party-Appointed Arbitrator – from Miami to Geneva, 107 AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. 387, 390-401 (2013) 
In Victor Pey Casado, the Claimant requested that Mr. Rezek, a party-appointed arbitrator, 
resign due to “improperly admitt[ing]” a draft on the tribunal’s jurisdictional decision, 
which pointed to a “loss of confidence” in the arbitrator.54 Significantly, only the party that 
appointed Rezek gained access to the copy of the decision.55 The arbitral proceedings 
continued after the resignation and replacement of Rezek.56 Therefore, by citing Victor Pey 
Casado, Slovenia attempted to show that its arbitral proceedings with Croatia could 
continue as planned, despite any arbitrator bias.57 
After hearing Slovenia’s argument, the Arbitral Tribunal responded.58 Specifically, 
to treat the “non-material” breach, as Slovenia described it, the Arbitral Tribunal replaced 
Sekolec and restarted the arbitral proceedings de novo.59 In addition, the Slovenian counsel 
replaced Drenik as Agent.60 After the changes were made, Slovenia argued that the 
Tribunal could perform its task as mandated by the Arbitration Agreement, and contrary to 
Croatia’s claim, the arbitral disputes did not become impossible to resolve as a result of the 
allegedly “irremediable corruption of the record of the proceedings.”61 Slovenia argued 
that arbitration could be salvaged under the Tribunal’s authority.62 In support of its 
argument, Slovenia cited an I.C.J. Advisory Opinion, Legal Consequences for States of the 
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia and Military and Paramilitary Activities 
in and against Nicaragua.63 In its opinion, the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) stated 
                                                 
(discussing the “Alabama arbitration” in 1872 between American and British parties, in which the arbitrators 
were involved in lengthy, yet open discussions with the members of counsel). 




58 Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 36. 
59 Id. at 46. 
60 Id. at 7-8, 30 (applying Article 37 of the ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Intentionally 
Wrongful Acts, which accepted “a declaration of wrongfulness” for non-material breaches, an act that 
Slovenia performed, selecting H.E. Mr. Ronny Abraham, the former I.C.J. president, as Slovenia’s new party-
appointed arbitrator on July 28, 2015, and selecting, as per Slovenia’s request, new party-appointed 
arbitrators, such as H.E. Mr. Rolf Einar Fife of Norway and Prof. Nicolas Michel of Switzerland, who 
replaced Prof. Vukas of Croatia). 
61 See id. at 29 (“This arbitration can and should continue to its conclusion, and can do so.”); see Ross, supra 
note 31, at 13 (remarking that “the scandal would be more serious if [the arbitration] involved one of the 
three members of the tribunal not appointed by the two states”). 
62 Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 29. 
63 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. Rep. 16, 47, ¶¶ 94-95 (June 
that ex parte communications only make an arbitral dispute impossible to resolve when 
such communications render the “object and purpose of the treaty” impossible to 
complete.64 Here, Slovenia argued, Croatia did not fulfill its burden of proof that the ex 
parte communications were a material breach of the Arbitration Agreement.65  
 Next, despite Croatia’s intended absence from future arbitral meetings, Slovenia 
claimed that the Arbitral Tribunal could continue the proceedings in accordance with 
Article 28(2) of the PCA Optional Rules.66 If Croatia were to successfully “delay” the 
proceedings by abstaining from future gatherings, arbitration would then lose its 
expeditious character.67 According to Slovenia, the losing side of arbitral proceedings 
would often attempt to “frustrate an arbitration agreement” by unilaterally withdrawing 
from arbitration.68 
Third, Slovenia contended that Croatia’s accession to the European Union was a 
“quid pro quo of the Parties’ agreement,” which permitted the Slovenian party to resolve 
all disputes revolving around the Bay and the territorial borders through state-to-state 
arbitration.69 Thus, Slovenia argued that Croatia could not terminate the Arbitration 
Agreement, especially since the nation “has irrevocably benefitted” as a new European 
Union member.70 In support of its argument, Slovenia cited the Fisheries Jurisdiction case 
to show that once a party vested the decision-making powers in an arbitrator, as Croatia 
did by joining the European Union, the party could not behave as if the agreement to 
arbitrate did not exist.71 Since the Arbitration Agreement sought to settle the border dispute 
between the two nations, Slovenia claimed that Croatia could not obstruct the direction of 
the arbitral proceedings.72 
Fourth, to counter Croatia’s reliance on the Vienna Convention, Slovenia 
considered Articles 60(4) and 42(2) of the Convention, which permit the nullification of a 
                                                 
21); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 
Rep. 14, 125, 138, ¶¶ 270, 275-76 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicar. v. U.S.]. 
64 Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 33; Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at 138, ¶ 275-76.  
65 Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 33. 
66 See id. at 32; PCA Optional Rules, supra note 19, at art. 28(2). 
67 Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 20. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 28. 
70 Id. 
71 Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment, 1973 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 21, ¶ 45 (Feb. 
2) [hereinafter U.K. v. Ice.]. 
72 Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 28. 
treaty only through “the provisions of the treaty.”73 The Vienna Convention could render 
the Arbitration Agreement null and void if no “prejudice” to the Arbitration Agreement 
would result from the action.74 Articles 60(4) and 65(4), in conjunction with rulings from 
the I.C.J., support the position that the Vienna Convention cannot alter any existing 
obligations between two arbitrating parties. Thus, Slovenia contended that the Vienna 
Convention does not justify the unilateral rescission of the agreement to arbitrate.75  
Lastly, in reaction to Croatia’s past concerns that the Slovenian government had 
access to confidential information of the arbitral proceedings and illicitly persuaded the 
other members of the Tribunal, Slovenia claimed that Croatia misinterpreted Erjavec’s 
comments to the Slovenian media.76 In addition, Slovenia contended that Sekolec and 
Drenik shared only two documents, which were already disclosed to Croatia.77 Members 
of the Tribunal, Slovenia claimed, may discuss the case with each other without any 
violation of ex parte communications, and such practice is “common and appropriate as 
part of a tribunal’s deliberations.”78 Thus, Slovenia claimed that the ex parte 
communications did not render the arbitral proceedings impossible to fulfill, and Croatia 
could not end its participation in the arbitration, according to Slovenia.79 
3. Partial Award and Rationale 
After the reconstituted Arbitral Tribunal held a hearing on March 17, 2016, the 
Tribunal issued the Partial Award on June 30, 2016 to explain the ex parte issue.80 The 
Tribunal decided that: (1) the Slovenian ex parte communications violated the Arbitration 
                                                 
73 Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 26. 
74 See id. at 26; Vienna Convention, supra note 39, at art. 60(4), 42(2). 
75 Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 26; Vienna Convention, supra note 39, at art. 60(4), 65(4) (“Nothing 
in the foregoing paragraphs shall affect the rights or obligations of the parties under any provisions in force 
binding the parties with regard to the settlement of disputes.”); U.K. v. Ice., 1973 I.C.J. at 21, ¶ 45; Fisheries 
Jurisdiction (Fed. Rep. of Ger. v. Ice.), Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment, 1973 I.C.J. Rep. 49, 66, ¶ 45 
(Feb. 2); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Dem. Rep. Congo v. 
Rwanda), Provisional Measures, 2002 I.C.J. Rep. 219, 246, ¶ 75 (July 19). 
76 Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 6, 13. 
77 See id. at 31. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 33-34. 
80 Press Release, Permanent Court of Arbitration, Conclusion of Hearing in the Arbitration between the 
Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Slovenia (Mar. 18, 2016), 
https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1604 (following Croatia’s note verbale from July 30, 2015, the 
Croatian Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs concluded that the Arbitration Agreement was terminated 
and that Croatia would not be taking further part in the proceedings); Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 8-
9. 
Agreement; (2) contrary to Croatia’s contention, the Tribunal disagreed that the Arbitration 
Agreement was rendered null and void; (3) “the arbitral proceedings pursuant to the 
Arbitration Agreement [would] continue,” (4) the Tribunal “[would] determine the further 
procedural steps” of the proceedings; and (5) the Tribunal would decide on questions of 
cost after the issuance of the Final Award.81 Although Slovenia violated the Arbitration 
Agreement, the Tribunal declared that the breach would not “affect the Tribunal’s ability, 
in its current composition, to render a final award independently and impartially.”82 Despite 
the Partial Award, Croatia continues to deny the applicability of the Arbitration 
Agreement.83  
The Tribunal explained the rationale for the Partial Award in detail.84 First, citing 
Article 28 of the PCA Optional Rules, the Tribunal held that Croatia was not permitted to 
unilaterally end the arbitral proceedings; instead, the arbitrators possessed kompetenz-
kompetenz to decide whether an agreement to arbitrate existed and whether the matter in 
dispute was arbitrable, not Croatia.85 Next, the Tribunal held that the reconstruction of the 
Tribunal had no effect on the Final Award, emphasizing that Sekolec did not share 
                                                 
81 Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 57. 
82 Press Release, Permanent Court of Arbitration, Tribunal Issues Partial Award: Arbitration Between Croatia 
and Slovenia to Continue (June 30, 2016), https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1785. 
83 Termination of the Arbitration Process Between Croatia and Slovenia: Causes and Consequences, THE 
REPUBLIC OF CROATIA: MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AND EUROPEAN AFFAIRS (June 30, 2016), 
http://www.mvep.hr/hr/ostalo/prestanak-arbitraznog-postupka/ (stating that the Partial Award had 
incorrectly decided that the neutrality and independence of the arbitrators were not in question and 
emphasizing that Croatia is no longer a party to the arbitral proceedings); Caroline Simson, Croatia-Slovenia 
Territorial Row Survives Arbitrator Contract, LAW360 (June 30, 2016, 5:34 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/812802/croatia-slovenia-territorial-row-survives-arbitrator-contact 
(according to Croatia’s Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, the Partial Award was “a missed 
opportunity for the arbitral tribunal to restore confidence in independence and impartiality of its own work, 
as well as confidence in international arbitration as such”); HAAG Odlučio, Arbitraža iz koje se Hrvatska 
povukla, ipak se nastavlja [The Hague Has Decided: The Arbitration from which Croatia Has Withdrawn is 
Nevertheless Ongoing], DNEVNIK (June 30, 2016, 6:06 PM), http://dnevnik.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/nastavlja-se-
arbitraza-za-granicu-izmedju-hrvatske-i-slovenije---441934.html (Croat.) (commenting that the arbitration 
process has been “irrevocably compromised,” while the then-Prime Minister Zoran Milanović criticized the 
decision of the Tribunal, remarking that “someone in the tribunal did something he should not have done. 
The Croatian Parliament has carried out an unanimous decision to terminate the proceedings, and that is how 
it is going to be”). 
84 Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 36.  
85 See id. at 37-41 (citing The Walfish Bay Boundary Case (Ger./ Gr. Brit.), Award of May 23, 1911, R.I.A.A. 
Vol. XI, 263, 307; Rio Grande Irrigation and Land Company (Gr. Brit. v. U.S.), Award of Nov. 28, 1923, 
R.I.A.A. Vol. VI, 131, 135-36; Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council (India v. Pak.), 
Judgment, 1972 I.C.J. Rep. 46, 53-54, ¶ 16 (Aug. 18) (“If a mere allegation, as yet unestablished, that a treaty 
was no longer operative could be used to defeat its jurisdictional clauses, all such clauses would become 
potentially a dead letter. . . .”) (emphasis added) [hereinafter ICAO Council]; China Minmetals Materials 
Imp. & Exp. Co. v. Chi Mei Corp., 334 F.3d 274, 288 (3d Cir. 2003) (“In its simplest form, competence-
competence simply means that the arbitrators can examine their own jurisdiction without waiting for a court 
to do so. . . .”) (citing William W. Park, Determining Arbitral Jurisdiction: Allocation of Tasks Between 
Courts and Arbitrators, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 133, 140 (1997)). 
previously unadmitted information with the arbitrators and that the procedural 
disadvantage to Croatia from the ex parte communications was minor, if not nonexistent.86 
Thus, the Tribunal believed that there remained no “obstacle to the continuation of the 
proceedings,” and the hearings resumed on April 26, 2017.87 
Although the Tribunal found that the arbitration could continue without prejudice 
to Croatia, the panel noted that if “any hesitation” as to the ability of the arbitrators to 
resolve the parties’ dispute surrounded the atmosphere of the proceedings, “[the Tribunal] 
would conclude that the proceedings must be terminated.”88 No such hesitation existed in 
the Tribunal’s eyes.89 Namely, the Tribunal would focus on “remedial action[s]” such as 
“reopening” the submission of evidence and other facts, which would stabilize the 
“procedural balance between the Parties” and eliminate further hesitation.90 
III. IMPARTIALITY AND PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS IN ARBITRATION 
Although the Tribunal held that Croatia could not unilaterally rescind the 
Arbitration Agreement, the Partial Award afforded minimal consideration to the 
importance of impartiality, independence, procedural fairness, and good faith in an arbitral 
setting.91 This is evidenced through examining the fundamental principles of arbitration 
and how the tribunal considered arbitral impartiality and procedural fairness in rendering 
its award.  When parties choose to settle their disputes through arbitration, each party 
surrenders its own ability to litigate all relevant matters in court.92 Despite the trade-off, 
arbitration remains an “adjudicatory” action, where a tribunal, just like a court, makes 
decisions on an “impartial” and “independent” basis.93 The tribunal’s informed 
adjudicatory decisions are determined primarily by the parties’ legal arguments and the 
evidence they put forth in support of their arguments; however, ex parte communications 
without the other party’s presence counteracts the principles of impartiality and procedural 
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89 Id. 
90 Id. at 48. 
91 Id. at 49-55. 
92 L. Ali Khan, Arbitral Autonomy, 74 LA. L. REV. 1, 8 (2013). 
93 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 215-16  (2d ed. 2014). 
fairness.94 As the article describes in detail, arbitrator impartiality and procedural fairness 
play important roles in arbitration. 
1. Impartiality in the Arbitration Agreement and the Croatian-Slovenian 
National Arbitration Laws 
 
 First, the Arbitration Agreement between and the national arbitration laws of 
Slovenia and Croatia identify arbitrator impartiality and independence as integral qualities 
of a proper arbitral proceeding.95 According to Article Four of the Arbitration Agreement, 
the Arbitral Tribunal was given the task to delineate the bounds of the Bay in accordance 
with “international law, equity, and the principle of good neighborly relations in order to 
achieve a fair and just result.”96 In the spirit of the Agreement, the Tribunal described the 
interests of both parties as “vital,” and if the arbitral proceedings could not reach the goal 
of a “fair and just result,” the Tribunal could rescind the Arbitration Agreement.97 
Consequently, arbitral impartiality, an integral part of “procedural fairness,” falls under the 
purpose of Article Four and plays a major role in the structure of the arbitral proceedings.98 
Both Laws on Arbitration for Slovenia and Croatia highlight the provisions on arbitral 
impartiality, the requirement of disclosure, and equal treatment of the parties.99 Lastly, the 
nearly verbatim provisions of both nations’ arbitration acts allow the arbitral tribunal to 
terminate the arbitration agreement if the proceedings become “impossible.”100 For 
                                                 
94 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1.1 (AM. LAW. 
INST. 2011); see also Lon L. Fuller & Kenneth I. Winston, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 
HARVARD L. REV. 353, 381 (1978) (regarding arbitration as a “special . . . form of adjudication”). 
95 Arbitration Agreement, supra note 13, at art. 4(b). 
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97 Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 56 (“If the Tribunal had any hesitation that the present process can 
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99 Law on Arbitration of Slovenia, Apr. 25, 2008, Official Gazette of Slovenia, May 9, 2008, art. 15(1), 21 
(Slovn.) (recognizing “the principle of good faith” in the interpretation of the national arbitration law); 
Croatian Law on Arbitration, Official Gazette of Croatia 88/2001, art. 12(1), 17(1) (Croat.); see generally 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. V(1)(d), Sept. 30, 1970, 
330 U.N.T.S. 38 (preventing the enforcement of an award if the “arbitral procedure was not in accordance 
with the agreement of the parties”). 
100 Law on Arbitration of Slovenia, supra note 99, at art. 36(2)(3); Croatian Law on Arbitration, supra note 
99, at art. 32(1)(3). 
instance, impossibility could occur when the object or purpose of the arbitration agreement 
is defeated.101  
2. Impartiality in the Permanent Court of Arbitration Optional Rules 
 
 Second, Article Ten of the Permanent Court of Arbitration Optional Rules for 
Arbitrating Disputes Between Two States, which is very similar to the national arbitration 
laws of Slovenia and Croatia, requires arbitrator impartiality and independence.102 A reason 
for impartiality is that the arbitrators must “provide fair and effective procedures for 
peaceful resolution of disputes.”103 Thus, if the conduct of arbitration leans prejudicially 
towards one side during ex parte communications, the fair and effective procedures in the 
Optional Rules would become compromised.104 Similarly, the arbitral tribunal must 
provide each party an equal chance to present its arguments.105 In conjunction with Article 
34(2), if the continuation of the arbitral proceedings would become “unnecessary” or 
“impossible,” the tribunal could rescind the arbitration agreement.106 Thus, impartial and 
independent arbitrators and procedural fairness are important aspects of the arbitration 
agreement, which are reflected in the Optional Rules of the PCA and the national 
arbitration laws.107 
3. Authors’ Perspectives on Impartiality and Fairness 
 
 Third, many scholars note the importance of arbitral impartiality and procedural 
fairness, which are threatened during ex parte communications.108 Echoing the principles 
                                                 
101 See also Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal, Judgment, 1991 I.C.J. Rep. 53, 70, ¶ 49 (Nov. 12). 
102 PCA Optional Rules, supra note 19, at art. 10(1). 
103 See id. at 43. 
104 Id. 
105 See id. at art. 15(1). 
106 See id. at art. 34(2); see also Law on Arbitration of Slovenia, supra note 99, at art. 36(2)(3); Croatian Law 
on Arbitration, supra note 99, at art. 32(1)(3). 
107 PCA Optional Rules, supra note 19, at art. 10(1), 13(3), 15(1), 17(1), 34(2); Law on Arbitration of 
Slovenia, supra note 99, at art. 2(1), 15(1), 21, 36(2)(3); Croatian Law on Arbitration, supra note 99, at art. 
12(1), 17(1), 32(1)(3). 
108 Bazil Oglinda, Key Criteria in Appointment of Arbitrators in International Arbitration, 5 TRIBUNA 
JURIDICA 124, 127 (2015); CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 498 (2d ed. 
2009); Mitchell L. Lathrop, Arbitrator Bias in the United States: A Patchwork of Decisions, 80 DEF. COUNS. 
J. 146, 146 (2013); Carita Wallgren-Lindholm, Uneven Representation and Imbalanced Resources Between 
Parties to an International Arbitration or in Relation to the Arbitral Tribunal: Restoring Reasonable Balance 
of the PCA Optional Rules, Bazil Oglinda, an arbitrator for the International Chamber of 
Commerce and the Romanian Chamber of Commerce, described impartiality as “the 
watchword of all tribunals, including arbitrators.”109 Even though parties appoint 
arbitrators that would serve the selector’s interests, the barrier between counsel and 
impartial arbitrators should remain standing.110  Once the barrier is torn down, many 
arbitration rules would permit vacatur of the arbitral award; therefore, the maintenance of 
arbitrator impartiality and independence, as well as procedural fairness to the parties, hold 
a high position of importance in arbitration.111 Analyzing multiple arbitration laws, 
scholars commented on the behavior of the arbitrators and its impacts on the equal 
treatment of the parties, such as in the United States, where the courts apply the Federal 
Arbitration Act’s “evident partiality” standard if the arbitrators have shown “corrupt” 
behavior or where the courts analyze whether the challenged arbitrator acted “in bad faith” 
to “deprive [a] party of a fundamentally fair proceeding.”112 Thus, arbitrator impartiality 
and procedural fairness are inextricably linked with dispute resolution. 
 In particular, Ms. Carita Wallgren-Lindholm, a member of the ICC International 
Court of Arbitration, and Mr. James Carter, a U.S. arbitrator with a great understanding of 
the ICC, LCIA, AAA, and ICSID, considered the role of an arbitrator and the 
impermissibility of ex parte communications, which damage procedural fairness.113 
                                                 
and Symmetry in the Hearing Room (or Not), in STORIES FROM THE HEARING ROOM: EXPERIENCE FROM 
ARBITRAL PRACTICE 195 (Domitille Baizeau & Bernd Ehle eds., 2015); James Carter, The Rights and Duties 
of the Arbitrator: Six Aspects of the Rule of Reasonableness, in THE STATUS OF THE ARBITRATOR 24 (ICC 
Pub. No. 564, 1995); Alfonso Gomez-Acebo, The Standard of Impartiality and Independence, in 34 PARTY-
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LAW LIBRARY 69, 79 (2016). 
109 Oglinda, supra note 108, at 127 (citing Amec Civil Eng’g Ltd. v. Sec’y of St. for Transp. [2004] EWHC 
2339 (TCC)). 
110 See id. at 129; see generally Schreuer, supra note 108, at 498 (describing that tribunals made up of party-
appointed arbitrators of the same nationality as the appointing party foster better understanding of the parties’ 
perspectives and arguments); ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 221 (2d ed. 1991) (“The presiding arbitrator must be, and be seen to be, neutral 
as well as impartial.”). 
111 Lathrop, supra note 108, at 146 (citing FRANCES A. KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION, 236-37 [1st ed. 
1948] [“Arbitration laws consider impartiality so important that they quite universally provide that, upon 
proof of bias, the award shall be set aside.”]).  
112 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (2017) (permitting the vacatur of an award if the arbitrators 
displayed “evident partiality”); Pochat v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 12-22397-CIV-
ROSENBAUM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119447, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 22, 2013); Louis Russo and Matthew 
Richardson, Your Arbitral Awards are Safe: U.S. Courts are Deferential to Arbitral Disclosure Rulings, 
MEALEY’S INTL. ARB. REP. 21 (2015); Silicon Power Corp. v. GE Zenith Controls, Inc., 661 F. Supp. 2d 524, 
538 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (“[Congress] barred federal courts from confirming awards tainted by partiality, a lack 
of elementary procedural fairness, corruption, or similar misconduct. This balance would be eviscerated, and 
the integrity of the arbitration process could be compromised, if parties could require that awards, flawed for 
any of these reasons, must nevertheless be blessed by federal courts.”) (emphasis added). 
113 Wallgren-Lindholm, supra note 108, at 195; Carter, supra note 108, at 24. 
Commenting from the perspective of a modern arbitrator, Wallgren-Lindholm wrote that 
arbitrators should prevent any party attempts at ex parte communications.114 She reasoned 
that ex parte communications with the arbitrator could lead to an “inappropriate flow of 
information or misdirected intentions.”115 Next, referring to the American Code of Ethics, 
Carter enumerated the six canons of arbitrator ethics.116 For instance, the arbitrator must 
“avoid [the] appearance of impropriety” and “be faithful to the relationship of trust and 
confidentiality inherent in that office.”117 Clarifying the latter canon, Carter explained that 
the arbitrator cannot make use of discovered information “to affect adversely the interest 
of others,” which could likely include information gained in ex parte discussions.118 
Wallgren-Lindholm’s and Carter’s analyses reflect the international opinion against ex 
parte communications; since parties agree to arbitration on the basis of trust for the process, 
arbitrators are obliged to maintain the parties’ trust in a fair and impartial manner.119 
 In addition, the impartiality and procedural fairness of arbitrators are often 
compared to that of judges.120 Alfonso Gomez-Acebo, the co-head of the International 
Arbitration Group at Baker McKenzie, described three requirements of an impartial and 
independent arbitrator.121 Namely, the arbitrator must: (1) have an “unbiased mind,” which 
is “not different” from a judge; (2) have an “unbiased behavior”; and (3) keep “a minimum 
distance” from the parties.122 Other scholars equate an arbitrator to a judge where practicing 
impartiality and procedural fairness is essential.123 Thus, the arbitrator has the obligation 
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122 See id. at 80-87 (regarding unbiased behavior as “the tribunal’s obligation to conduct the procedure 
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123 Mohammed Bedjaoui, The Arbitrator: One Man-Three Roles – Some Independent Comments on the 
Ethical and Legal Obligations of an Arbitrator, 5 J. INT’L ARB. 7, 8 (1988) (separating the arbitrator in three 
categories: (1) an arbitrator as a common law judge; (2) an arbitrator as a judge selected by the parties; and 
(3) an arbitrator as a catalyzer to the negotiated rules between the parties). 
to act in a way that would grant the parties “a fair and public hearing.”124 The comparison 
of arbitrators with judges explains the arbitrator’s “quasi-judicial” role, in which the 
arbitrator must deliver a “faithful, honest and disinterested” analysis of the proceedings.125 
Therefore, just like a judge, the arbitrator acts as a counterbalance of fairness between the 
arbitrating parties.126 Because the arbitrator as adjudicator adopts the role of the judge, the 
arbitrator supports the framework of arbitration, which includes the enforcement of the 
parties’ agreement to resolve all disputes fairly and impartially via the arbitral process.127 
4. Impartiality and Procedural Fairness in National Arbitration Laws and 
Arbitration Rules 
 
 Fourth, in addition to the arbitral laws of Slovenia and Croatia, other national 
arbitration laws and rules emphasize the importance of impartiality and procedural 
fairness.128 For example, the arbitration law of Austria regards the principles of “fair 
treatment of the parties” and due process as “general principles,” which are essential to the 
character of the arbitral proceedings; therefore, the parties cannot waive these 
protections.129 The Austrian arbitral laws are thus comparable to principles of a judge’s 
impartiality and equal treatment of the parties in litigation.130 The English Arbitration Act 
of 1996 lists impartiality of the tribunal as both an “object of arbitration” and a general 
principle; in addition, the tribunal must “act fairly and impartially as between the 
                                                 
124 Ahmed S. El-Kosheri & Karim Y. Youssef, The Independence of International Arbitrators: An 
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125 David J. Branson, American Party-Appointed Arbitrators—Not the Three Monkeys, 30 DAYTON L. REV. 
1, 49 (2004) (citing Barcon Assoc. Inc. v. Tri-County Asphalt Corp., 86 N.J. 179, 188 (1981)). 
126 See also Peter M. Friedman, Don’t I Know You From Somewhere? Why Due Process Should Bar Judges 
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128 See generally Law on Arbitration of Slovenia, supra note 99, at art. 21; Croatian Law on Arbitration, 
supra note 99, at art. 17. 
129 Christoph Liebscher & Dorit Ungar, The New Austrian Arbitration Law and the Federal Arbitration Law 
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130 Id. 
parties.”131 Therefore, the arbitral laws of Slovenia and Croatia are not unique in describing 
the standards for arbitrator impartiality. 
Arbitration rules, including those from London Court of International Arbitration 
(LCIA), the American Arbitration Association (AAA), and the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules, require that the arbitrators be “strictly impartial,” and, as a corollary, the rules forbid 
any ex parte communications between party members and arbitrators.132 In addition, 
institutional rules from other parts of the globe contain provisions similar to the PCA, such 
as the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre, Singapore International Arbitration 
Centre, Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services, Vienna International Arbitration 
Centre, and International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution.133 As a result, 
virtually all national arbitration laws and institutional rules value impartiality of the arbitral 
tribunal and procedural fairness toward the parties; if arbitrators favor one of the parties in 
a partial manner, the arbitral proceedings could become tainted.134 
5. Codes of Ethics 
 
 Fifth, arbitral codes of ethics have increasingly won acceptance in international 
arbitration, and they reinforce the necessity of impartiality in arbitration.135 In international 
practice, arbitrators hold a high regard for the implementation of the IBA Guidelines on 
Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration.136 According to General Standard 1 of the 
IBA Guidelines, the arbitrator must act in an impartial and independent way, which is 
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described as a “fundamental principle.”137 Lawrence Newman and David Zaslowsky 
described Articles 5.3 and 5.4 of the IBA Rules of Ethics for International Arbitrators, 
which forbid “unilateral communications” and require arbitrators to inform the other party 
or arbitrators of any “improper communication[s].”138 The Guidelines reflect the “more 
commonly expressed European claim that international arbitration practices are that party 
appointed arbitrators are completely neutral,” even though party appointed arbitrators may 
provide better clarification of the selecting party’s arguments to the rest of the Tribunal.139 
Therefore, the IBA Guidelines and Rules of Ethics discourage the arbitrators from 
engaging in ex parte proceedings, and they echo the growing international consensus on 
arbitrator impartiality and independence.140 
6. Impartiality and Procedural Fairness in Arbitral Decisions 
 
 Furthermore, arbitral decisions show the importance of impartiality of the 
arbitrators and procedural fairness. In particular, one unpublished ICC decision focused on 
the behavior of an arbitrator, who was “an acting judge” and had access to information that 
other members of the tribunal did not possess.141 Because personal and unequal access to 
information led to questions about the arbitrator’s impartiality, the ICC Court did not 
“confirm [the arbitrator] on ‘grounds of [his] past.’”142 Thus, arbitrators must base their 
decisions on the arguments and evidence presented by both parties, instead of relying on 
ex parte sources.   
 In the unpublished case, ICC Case 12171, a maritime arbitral proceeding between 
the claimant, a Croatian shipyard, and the respondent, a German company, the ICC Court 
held that the award was “non-binding upon the parties” since the German respondent 
engaged in ex parte communications with the expert arbitrator.143 In its decision, the ICC 
Court first commented on the lack of impartiality and independence of the expert 
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arbitrator.144 Namely, the arbitrator “had discussions with [Respondent] about the [arbitral] 
procedure” and believed that he was “very close to Respondent”; the arbitrator was not in 
contact with the claimant, and the claimant was unaware of the ex parte communications 
between the arbitrator and the respondent.145 However, unlike the current conflict between 
Croatia and Slovenia, the Court was unsure if the expert arbitrator’s affinity for the German 
respondent affected the expert arbitrator’s impartiality and independence.146 Nevertheless, 
the Court analyzed whether the arbitrator violated the Croatian claimant’s right of equal 
treatment and procedural fairness.147 Similar to the current dispute regarding the Bay of 
Piran/Savudrija, the arbitrator was twice engaged in secret ex parte communications with 
the German respondent, and as a result, the claimant was not able to provide the arbitrator 
with its own documents to support the Croatian argument and counter the German 
position.148  The ICC case was significant because the Court heavily considered various 
factors in annulling an award, including the impartiality and independence of the arbitrator, 
as well as the right of the parties to be heard.149 Although a sole arbitrator settled the 
Croatian-German dispute, the ICC Court did not make a distinction between a sole 
arbitrator and a party-appointed arbitrator; thus, the ICC followed the increasing 
international emphasis on discouraging any behavior that would compromise the 
impartiality of the arbitrator, which would have otherwise led to an unfair decision.150 
 Moreover, the Buraimi Oasis case of 1955 between the United Kingdom and Saudi 
Arabia illustrated that the violation of ex parte proceedings, if extensive, could lead not 
only to an annulled award but also to abandoned arbitral proceedings.151 In Buraimi Oasis, 
the Saudi party-appointed arbitrator, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, was often in contact with the 
Saudi Arabian counsel.152 The Saudi government bribed multiple arbitrators to decide in 
Saudi Arabia’s favor; in response, the arbitrators resigned from both sides until the process 
was abandoned.153 Global Arbitration Review described that the ex parte proceedings and 
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the replacement of biased arbitrators caused an “instigation of the tribunal.”154 The 
violation of the ex parte rule in Buraimi Oasis countered Slovenia’s emphasis on the 
Alabama Arbitration case of 1872, where U.S. agents and arbitrators were in constant, 
extensive, yet acceptable contact with one another; however, the Alabama Arbitration’s 
role was to show the value of parties selecting their own arbitrators.155  Alabama 
Arbitration does not explicitly support the violation of ex parte restrictions, and the trend 
in today’s institutional rules and national arbitration statutes supports the movement 
towards greater arbitrator impartiality.156 
Some arbitral decisions likewise implied the necessity of arbitrator impartiality in 
carrying out the arbitration agreement.  For example, in Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal, the 
International Court of Justice described two major goals of state-to-state arbitration: (1) to 
“entrust an arbitral tribunal with the task of settling a dispute in accordance with the terms 
agreed by the parties”; and (2) to settle all disputes “peaceful[ly] and [definitely] . . . that 
had theretofore been incapable of amicable resolution.”157 Arbitration, therefore, requires 
trust in the arbitrators to deliver an award in compliance with the arbitration agreement, 
and the proceedings must be carried out fairly and amicably; without fair and amicable 
proceedings, the parties would have very likely not opted to settle their disputes via 
arbitration.158  
7. Procedural Fairness in Case Law 
 
Case law likewise stresses the need for procedural fairness in arbitration.  The court 
in Pochat, a U.S. decision, held that an arbitrator’s misconduct in the admission of evidence 
could lead to annulment of the award; in particular, the court analyzed as a factor whether 
the arbitrator’s decision to admit particular evidence was “so gross as to deprive the party 
of a fundamentally fair proceeding. . . .”159 The court’s emphasis on procedural fairness 
corresponds to the important attributes of arbitration.160 Taking procedural fairness one 
step further in the area of ex parte communications, Gary Born stated that “undisclosed ex 
parte contacts concerning the merits of the parties’ dispute are presumptively regarded as 
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improper.”161 To support this claim, Born cited United Food, where an arbitral award was 
challenged due to an arbitrator’s involvement in ex parte communications; namely, the 
arbitrator made use of the information gained in these discussions.162 Various cases such 
as United Food, however, illustrate that the complainant must show more than the mere 
existence of ex parte communications to annul an award or the proceedings, such as 
presenting evidence of the communications’ effect on procedural fairness or proving the 
breach of the object and purpose of the arbitration agreement.163  
8. Parties’ Obligations 
 
Lastly, the arbitrating parties likewise hold specific obligations, including the 
requirement to act in good faith.164 Applicable to arbitration agreements, Article 26 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties holds that arbitration agreements are “binding 
upon the parties,” and such agreements “must be performed [by the parties] in good 
faith.”165 The concept of good faith is central in international relations, as stated by the 
commentary to the Vienna Convention.166 The commentary cited several arbitral decisions 
which required the parties to act in good faith, such as in the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries 
proceedings.167 The good faith-spirit of Article 26 of the Vienna Convention is present in 
Article 10(1) of the Arbitration Agreement between Slovenia and Croatia, which forbids 
either party from “intensify[ing] the dispute or jeopardiz[ing] the work of the Arbitral 
                                                 
161 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS, 745 (2d ed. 2015) (emphasis 
added). 
162 United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union v. SIPCO, No. 4-90-CV-70250, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
21332, at *29-30 (D. Iowa Dec. 30, 1992). 
163 See Glass, Molders, Pottery v. Excelsior Foundry, 56 F.3d 844, 846 (7th Cir. 1995) (“An ex parte contact 
is not an automatic ground for invalidating such an award.”); Spector v. Torenberg, 852 F. Supp. 201, 209 
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“[A] party must show that [the ex parte] conversation deprived [the party] of a fair hearing 
and influenced the outcome of the arbitration.”); United States Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Nat’l Ins. Co., 591 
F.3d 1167, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (requiring the party to show both the existence of ex parte communications 
and the effect of the communications on the “rights of a party” to challenge an award). 
164 See also Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1321-22 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (describing the 
arbitration agreement as one “which must rest in the good faith and honor of the parties”); Vienna 
Convention, supra note 39, at art. 26. 
165 Vienna Convention, supra note 39, at art. 26. 
166 Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, Rep. of the Comm. to the G.A. 211 (1966), 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/1_1_1966.pdf [hereinafter Draft Articles on 
the Law of Treaties]. 
167 Id. (citing Reports of International Arbitral Awards, vol. XI, 188 [1910], which held that the Treaty of 
Ghent limited Great Britain’s regulation of fisheries rights by the principle of good faith).   
Tribunal.”168 In sum, the requirement of good faith among the parties plays a key role in 
settling the Bay dispute under the “principles of international law” and “good neighbourly 
relations.”169 Articles 4 and 10(1) of the Arbitration Agreement, taken together, emphasize 
good faith by all actors in the arbitral process; therefore, the acts of individual parties 
cannot purposely undermine the goals of arbitration, an adjudicative process.170 If only 
arbitrators were required to act in good faith and to carry out the arbitration agreement, 
parties could likely be encouraged to adopt underhanded tactics to receive an unfair 
advantage in the arbitral proceedings; it thus follows that the parties have similar 
obligations to act in good faith.171  
If the arbitral proceedings do not follow the principles of impartiality, 
independence, and procedural fairness, the arbitral institution would likewise feel the 
negative impacts of the ethical violations.172 When the arbitrator’s sense of independence 
and impartiality is not trusted, then the parties’ faith in the arbitral proceedings could be 
jeopardized “in an ir[r]eparable way.”173 Thus, the behavior of the arbitrators and the 
parties can have a significant impact on the arbitral proceedings and ultimately, the 
result.174 With a tainted arbitral proceeding, arbitration ceases to function as an acceptable 
method of amicably settling the parties’ disputes in particular institutions, thus increasing 
the risk of an annulled award or of rescinded arbitration agreements.175 Therefore, tainted 
ex parte communications clash with the integrity of arbitral institutions, as well as with 
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arbitrator impartiality and procedural fairness, two vital elements of state-to-state 
arbitration.176 
IV. THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL’S PARTIAL AWARD AS MUDDIED BY THE DEFILED 
PROCEEDINGS  
The Arbitral Tribunal in Croatia v. Slovenia erred in continuing the arbitral 
proceedings, notwithstanding Croatia’s unilateral rescission of the Arbitration Agreement. 
Four issues in the case muddied the Tribunal’s decision. First, the Tribunal did not place 
much emphasis on the purpose of the Arbitration Agreement to settle the Bay dispute in 
regard to the “principles of international law” and “good neighbourly relations.”177 Second, 
the Tribunal understated the impact of the ex parte communications on the fairness of the 
arbitral proceedings.178 Third, the replacement of the party-appointed arbitrators could not 
have remedied the issue regarding Slovenia’s access to information on the arbitral 
proceedings and the Tribunal’s new knowledge of the case information.179 Finally, 
Slovenia’s behavior during the proceedings violated the good-faith requirement of both the 
Vienna Convention and the Arbitration Agreement.180 
1. The Purpose of the Arbitration Agreement 
 
 First, the Arbitral Tribunal incorrectly claimed that the purpose and main goal of 
the arbitral proceedings between Slovenia and Croatia were not “defeated” and that the 
arbitral proceedings could continue in the absence of Croatian counsel.181 Although Article 
65 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties invokes a presumption of validity of 
treaties (including arbitration agreements), Article 60 of the Vienna Convention permits a 
party to revoke the arbitration agreement if the breach of the agreement was “material.”182 
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For a breach to be “material,” the act must be a “violation of a provision essential to the 
accomplishment of the object or purpose of the [arbitration agreement].”183 For instance, 
the Nicaragua case in the I.C.J. held that an act that “undermines the whole spirit of the 
agreement” is likewise a material violation of the arbitration agreement.184 The Convention 
reflects the spirit and the intent of the parties to arbitrate.185 
 According to the purpose of the Arbitration Agreement, which is explained in 
Article 4(b), the Arbitral Tribunal must apply “international law, equity, and the principle 
of good neighbourly relations” in fairly resolving the Bay dispute between the parties.186 
The PCA Optional Rules’ provisions on arbitrator impartiality and case law also shape the 
purpose of an arbitration agreement.187  The Tribunal correctly stated that in Guinea-Bissau 
v. Senegal, an I.C.J. case, the purpose of an arbitration agreement is “to entrust an 
arbitration tribunal with the task of settling a dispute in accordance with the terms agreed 
by the parties, who define in the agreement the jurisdiction of the tribunal and determine 
its limits” and to reach a “peaceful and definitive settlement of a dispute that had 
theretofore been incapable of amicable resolution.”188 However, the current Tribunal 
placed too much weight on finality as the main goal of arbitration, for there was virtually 
no consideration of arbitrator impartiality and procedural fairness in framing the goals.189 
As explained by the Reporters to the U.S. Restatement (Third) and other scholars, 
arbitration serves an adjudicatory function, which includes the impartiality and 
independence of arbitrators, as well as procedural fairness.190 The adjudicatory decisions 
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of arbitrators are based on the evidence and legal arguments of the parties during the 
arbitral proceedings, not on ex parte communications, which take place outside of the 
arbitral proceedings.191 Since ex parte communications conflict with the purpose of the 
current Arbitration Agreement, which includes resolving disputes in accordance with 
arbitrator impartiality and procedural fairness, Slovenia’s act did constitute a material 
breach of the Arbitration Agreement. Because there was “hesitation” that the current 
arbitral process could solve the Bay dispute in an impartial and fair manner, the Arbitration 
Agreement could have been rendered null and void.192 Taken together, the Arbitration 
Agreement should have been rescinded under Article 60(1) of the Vienna Convention, 
contrary to the Tribunal’s contention.193  
 Furthermore, the Tribunal correctly recognized Croatia’s admission to the 
European Union as the quid pro quo of the Arbitration Agreement.194 However, this EU- 
“nexus” could not justify Slovenia’s unhampered use of ex parte communications to distort 
the arbitral proceedings and violate the constituent goals of arbitration.195 In the Partial 
Award, the Tribunal held that “the [Arbitration] Agreement was negotiated with the full 
support of the European Union. . . .”196 The support from the European Union did not mean 
that arbitration was to be sole method of resolving the Bay dispute.197 In a September 2015 
article, the European Commission (EC) supported the negotiations to arbitrate, “which 
[was] in the interest of the legal security for both parties. . . .”198 However, the EC left open 
the possibility of non-arbitral cooperation; therefore, the European Union’s nexus to the 
Arbitration Agreement is not as strong as the Tribunal described it.199 Slovenia’s contention 
that Croatia’s rescission of the Arbitration Agreement would jeopardize “the essential quid 
pro quo of the Parties’ agreement, [such as Croatia’s accession to the European Union]” is 
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therefore inaccurate.200 In addition, the Tribunal has not shown that the goal of EU 
membership was a better reflection of the “whole spirit of the Agreement” than arbitrator 
impartiality and procedural fairness; rather, the Tribunal has only shown that there was a 
supposed “nexus” between EU membership and binding dispute resolution, which does not 
erase the adjudicative function of arbitration.201 The quid pro quo of arbitration, Croatia’s 
admission to the EU, cannot contradict the purpose of the Arbitration Agreement, which is 
to settle all disputes in an impartial and procedurally fair manner.202 As a result, Slovenia’s 
ex parte communications were a material breach under Article 60 of the Vienna 
Convention. 
2. Ex Parte Communications’ Impact on the Arbitral Proceedings 
 
 Second, the Tribunal understated the impact of Slovenia’s ex parte communications 
on the arbitral proceedings.203 According to the Tribunal, Arbitrator Sekolec only presented 
two documents to the Tribunal and subsequently to the parties.204 As common arbitral 
practice, Sekolec wrote “personal and confidential notes regarding the border on or around 
Dragonja,” which “summarise[d] his point of view.”205 Next, Sekolec presented a 
collection of documents to the Registry of the Tribunal; however, the Registry created its 
own official index of documents without the assistance of Sekolec’s submissions.206 
Because the two official documents supposedly contained no new information about the 
Bay dispute, the Tribunal incorrectly held that the ex parte communications did not affect 
the “procedural balance” of the arbitral proceedings, contrary to Croatia’s objections.207 
Even if the documents introduced by Sekolec did not contribute new information, the ex 
parte communications did not solely impact the type of documents that were admitted in 
the proceedings.208 
 Although the Tribunal recognized that Sekolec only submitted two documents, 
Croatia reasonably feared that Slovenia’s ex parte communications affected the course of 
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arbitration beyond the submission of two documents. Further, Croatia feared that the mere 
substitution of Sekolec and Vukas as party-appointed arbitrators would not alleviate the 
issue.209 Due to the potential widespread effect of the discussions between Sekolec and 
Drenik, Croatia “could no longer determine” the exact, negative contributions of the ex 
parte communications to the arbitral proceeding.210 The discovered transcripts from 2014-
2015 show that Drenik discussed with Sekolec: (a) possible strategies on ways to persuade 
the arbitrators both during and outside of arbitral proceedings; and (b) the exchange of 
Slovenian documents under Sekolec’s name.211 In particular, Drenik suggested that 
Sekolec introduce new documents as if he were the author of the documents, and Drenik 
likewise suggested multiple arguments and scenarios that Sekolec could make while dining 
with the arbitrators, such as with Bruno Simma.212  
Although arbitrators may discuss arbitral issues with one another outside of the 
proceedings, the conflict lies in the fact that the Slovenian counsel was attempting to 
unfairly influence the non-party appointed arbitrators by introducing new arguments, 
perspectives, and evidence without the presence of Croatian counsel.213 The role of a party-
appointed arbitrator is to help the Tribunal better understand the position of the party who 
selected that arbitrator, not to act as a secret mouthpiece to sway the Tribunal.214 Thus, ex 
parte communications do not exclusively affect the validity of documents presented by a 
party-appointed arbitrator, as the Tribunal seemed to suggest, but they could also 
substantively and prejudicially affect the Tribunal’s understanding of the dispute through 
a Slovenian lens without the presence of opposing counsel, Croatia.215 The altered 
understanding of the dispute could subsequently have an impact on the official record of 
the arbitration.216 Even without Sekolec’s and Vukas’ involvement in the Tribunal, the rest 
of the Tribunal would still retain knowledge of Sekolec’s – and ultimately the Slovenian 
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counsel’s – ex parte arguments, thus compromising the impartiality of the arbitrators and 
placing Croatia at a procedural disadvantage. 
3. The Replacement of the Party-Appointed Arbitrators 
 
 Furthermore, Croatia reasonably feared that the Slovenian counsel had “informal” 
access to information discussed by the Tribunal, which weakens the Tribunal’s position 
that “an impartial and independent decision-making process can be guaranteed.”217 In 
January and April 2015, coinciding with the time when the ex parte communications 
between Sekolec and Slovenian counsel began, Mr. Erjavec, the Foreign Minister of 
Slovenia, claimed that he possessed “an informal channel of communication with the 
tribunal.”218 In addition, Erjavec described in an interview that the Tribunal would rule in 
favor of Slovenia’s interpretation of the Bay ownership.219 The comments reflect the 
possible exchange of information between the Slovenian counsel and Sekolec, which is a 
violation of Article 10(1) of the Arbitration Agreement.220 Therefore, Erjavec’s interview 
showed the extent to which Slovenia was capable of influencing the results of the 
arbitration via Sekolec’s ex parte involvement.221 Therefore, even if Sekolec and Vukas 
were replaced as arbitrators, as the Tribunal ordered, the Slovenian counsel would have 
still retained access to the information gained by the “informal channel of communication,” 
such as the arbitrators’ viewpoints on certain facts or arguments.222 The “channel” works 
both ways; namely, the remaining members of the Tribunal would nevertheless mentally 
retain any form of ex parte information or strategies conveyed by Sekolec’s meetings with 
the individual arbitrators.223 Such access to the Tribunal weakens the purpose of arbitration, 
which is to settle all disputes in an adjudicative and impartial manner.224 
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4. Violation of the Good-Faith Requirement under the Vienna Convention 
 
 Fourth, contrary to the Tribunal’s reasoning that Slovenia’s ex parte 
communications did not “render the continuation of the proceedings impossible” under 
Article 60(1) of the Vienna Convention, Slovenia’s behavior violated the good-faith 
requirement under the Arbitration Agreement and resultantly devalued the purpose of 
arbitration.225 Parties must conduct themselves in good faith during arbitral proceedings 
and negotiations.226 Following the principle of “pacta sunt servanda,” Article 26 of the 
Vienna Convention requires the parties to comply with arbitration agreements in good 
faith.227 Article 26 of the Vienna Convention played an important role in the Gabčikovo-
Nagymaros Project case, in which the I.C.J. requested the Hungarian and Slovakian parties 
“to find an agreed solution that takes into account the objectives of the Treaty, which must 
be pursued in a joint and integrated way. . . .”228 The Court in Gabčikovo also held that the 
purpose of a treaty and the requirement of good faith are one and the same; the concept of 
good faith implies that the parties would implement the arbitration agreement “in a 
reasonable way and in such a manner that its purpose can be realized.”229 The rationale in 
Gabčikovo is reflected in the current Arbitration Agreement, where the parties were 
expected to maintain “good neighbourly relations” by not interfering with the Tribunal’s 
mandate.230 Thus, the behavior of the parties was tightly knit with the purpose of the 
Arbitration Agreement.231 
 Here, Slovenia failed to act in good faith, which frustrated the Arbitration 
Agreement’s purpose. Thus, Croatia reasonably lost faith in the current arbitral process to 
such an extent as to rescind the Arbitration Agreement.232 Although Slovenia agreed that 
the Arbitral Tribunal would apply the “principle of good neighbourly relations” to the 
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dispute, Slovenia engaged in extended ex parte communications with Sekolec without 
Croatia’s knowledge, and the ex parte communications likely affected the impartiality of 
the whole Tribunal and procedural fairness negatively.233 In addition, Erjavec possessed an 
“informal channel of communication” with the Tribunal, which strengthened the suspicion 
of unfair dealings.234 Although Croatia uncovered the transcripts between Sekolec and 
Drenik, Slovenia continued to claim that Croatia, as a new EU member, was bound to the 
Arbitration Agreement.235 Despite the EU’s recognition of other methods to decide the Bay 
dispute, Slovenia continues to demand that Croatia be subject to the decisions of the 
Tribunal, whose judgment was tampered with in favor of Slovenia.236  Slovenia’s ex parte 
discussions did not symbolize good faith or “good neighbourly relations.”237 Contrary to 
the Tribunal’s holding, Slovenia’s actions undermined the goal of the Arbitration 
Agreement, and since there was “hesitation” of fulfilling the good-faith goals of arbitration, 
the Tribunal should have annulled the arbitral proceedings.238 
V. FEAR OF EXPANDED GROUNDS FOR THE RESCISSION OF AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT 
Despite Slovenia’s contention that the purpose of the arbitral proceedings was “to 
settle the dispute submitted to it” and to issue a final award, the ex parte communications 
“contaminated” the proceedings, as Croatia argued.239 Thus, Croatia’s loss of faith in the 
arbitral proceedings and the defiling of the arbitral proceedings should have led to the 
unilateral rescission of the Arbitration Agreement.240 However, one of the sought-after 
benefits of arbitration is its binding and expeditious character.241 Normally, parties may 
                                                 
233 Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 43-44 (citing Section 9.1 of the Terms of Appointment, where “[t]he 
Parties shall not engage in any oral or written communications with any member of the Arbitral Tribunal ex 
parte in connection with the subject matter of the arbitration or any procedural issues that are related to the 
proceedings”). 
234 Ross, supra note 31, at 7.  
235 Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 28. 
236 Id. 
237 Arbitration Agreement, supra note 13, at art. 4(b). 
238 Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 55. 
239 See id. at 42, 48. 
240 See id. at 19. 
241 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND PRACTICE 4 (2d ed. 2015) (defining arbitration 
as “a process by which parties consensually submit a dispute to a non-governmental decision-maker, selected 
by or for the parties, to render a binding decision resolving a dispute in accordance with neutral, adjudicatory 
procedures affording each party an opportunity to present its case”). 
not unilaterally declare arbitration agreements void, except in very rare circumstances.242 
In most situations, the arbitral tribunal would decide on its jurisdiction through the doctrine 
of kompetenz-kompetenz, where the tribunal would determine whether an agreement to 
arbitrate exists or is valid.243   
 Slovenia’s contention that the purpose of the arbitral proceedings was “to settle the 
dispute submitted to it” would seem to contradict with Croatia’s demand to end the arbitral 
proceedings.244 One might fear that if all arbitrating parties were to challenge the existence 
of the arbitration agreement due to arbitrator partiality, procedural unfairness, or ex parte 
communications, the binding characteristics of arbitration would gradually fade away.245 
According to ICAO Council, “all such [arbitration] clauses would become potentially a 
dead letter” if parties would continue to challenge the arbitration agreement’s existence.246 
Likewise, the expeditiousness of arbitration would fall under attack, for challenges to the 
arbitration agreement would slow down the arbitral process.247  
 However, if Croatia successfully rescinded the Arbitration Agreement, the decision 
would not set a dangerous precedent. Rather, the decision to terminate the arbitration 
agreement would be based on material violations of the agreement’s purpose, which the 
transcripts of the ex parte communications extensively revealed. If the rescinding party 
cannot prove such material violations, the courts should not recognize the unilateral 
termination of the arbitration agreement. The idea echoed here is not new; it is already 
reflected in both Articles 60(1) and 31(1) the Vienna Convention, which requires the 
interpretation of and compliance with a treaty (in this case, an arbitration agreement) with 
regard to “its object and purpose.”248  
 The heavy burden of proof of rescinding an arbitration agreement under Article 
60(1) of the Vienna Convention, therefore, would fall on rescinding parties, such as 
Croatia.249 A claim that the opposing party was engaged in ex parte communications with 
its appointed arbitrator would not be sufficient in itself to render the arbitration agreement 
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void.250 On the other hand, if the ex parte communications would lead to a “defect[ed]” 
arbitral system, the arbitration agreement’s purpose to settle all disputes in a fair and 
impartial manner would fail.251 The cases the Tribunal cited support this rationale, such as 
in Victor Pey Casado, where the arbitral tribunal replaced a party-appointed arbitrator upon 
discovering the exchange of a drafted tribunal decision with its appointing party; here, the 
exchange of a single document was not enough to defile the arbitral system.252 However, 
if the rescinding party could extensively show that the ex parte discussions both: (1) 
violated the main purpose of the arbitration agreement; and (2) tainted the process of 
arbitration, the party could likely rescind the arbitration agreement.   
  Even though ex parte communications contravene both the adjudicative nature of 
arbitration and the requirement that parties settle their disputes on the basis of 
“international law, equity, and the principle of good neighbourly relations,” which are the 
main purposes of the arbitration between Slovenia and Croatia, the rescinding party must 
additionally show that the ex parte transgression had a negative impact on the arbitral 
process.253  Without demonstrating this, the defect could be cured by simply replacing the 
party-appointed arbitrators and counsel members engaged in ex parte communications and 
restarting the proceedings, as the current Tribunal decided.254 The current arbitral dispute, 
however, is sui generis; rarely would the rescinding party discover the transcripts and 
contents of the ex parte communications, as well as multiple statements from the Slovenian 
government regarding its opinions of and involvement with the arbitral proceedings.255 
Unlike in Victor Pey Casado, Croatia was not concerned with one document that 
summarized the Tribunal’s rationale of the proceedings after careful consideration of all 
facts and arguments presented by both parties.256 Instead, through the transcripts and 
Erjavec’s public comments, the Croatian counsel saw that ex parte communications 
provided a means for the Slovenian counsel to gain access to and extensively affect the 
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thought process of the Tribunal in a thirteen-month period without Croatia’s knowledge, 
such as by considering new oral or written evidence, attaching different weights to 
particular arguments in ways that might not be reflected in the Tribunal’s official report, 
and granting strategical insight to the Slovenian counsel as to how the Tribunal might in 
the future react to particular arguments.257  
Thus, the evidence that Croatia provided must have also shown that the arbitral 
process had been comprehensively affected unfairly in favor of Slovenia to stipulate that 
the task of the Tribunal had been rendered impossible to fulfill.258 Since in very few 
situations could parties successfully prove that the ex parte discussions both violated the 
purpose of the arbitration agreement and defiled the arbitral proceedings, the editor’s 
disagreement with the Tribunal’s decision would not lead to more frivolous challenges to 
the agreements to arbitrate. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Croatia v. Slovenia dispute brought to light the conflict between major tenets 
of state-to-state arbitration, including finality over a border dispute that arose after the fall 
of Yugoslavia and procedural fairness in the arbitral proceedings.  The Arbitral Tribunal’s 
analysis raised an important question regarding arbitration’s ability to resolve long-
standing disputes in an adjudicative manner: at what point must the binding character of 
arbitration give way to the integrity of the proceedings?  In most cases, rules of arbitral 
institutions assume that both finality and impartiality can be achieved. However, in 
conflicts where both parties have much at stake, parties may turn to strategies that could 
compromise the integrity of the arbitral proceedings, such as through ex parte 
communications.  If arbitrator impartiality and procedural fairness in reaching a binding 
decision were cast out as the main goals of arbitration, arbitration would be seen as a 
repressive tool to reach a particular result by any means necessary. The punishment for ex 
parte communications or any other attempt to influence the Tribunal, such as by replacing 
the arbitrators, would be relatively slight when one looks at the sought-after award: access 
to the Bay. Croatia v. Slovenia will serve as a landmark case for future disputes dealing 
with ex parte communications and arbitrator impartiality. Arbitral tribunals will need to 
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